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 The purpose of this research is to identify important political and economic factors that 
affect human rights conditions. In conjunction, it is also important to identify common themes in 
human rights studies, particularly emphasizing the role of regime type. Lastly, this study’s 
primary focus is to answer the question: do human rights have any impact on U.S. trade? The 
end result shows that human rights are not an important factor to U.S. trade.  
 The U.S. is balancing trade and human rights. Often, these ideas are in conflict. This 
study will examine the U.S. political, economic, and strategic motives in the context of human 
rights, particularly focusing on bilateral trade engagement with other countries. The use of a 
cross-sectional time series analysis will be applied to examine trade and human rights from 
1981-2007. These results will provide an important empirical contribution to the literatures and 
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 Why is the study of human rights so fascinating, interesting, and challenging? Who is 
responsible for protecting the rights of individuals? The answer seems like it should be simple 
because one would think that human rights is guaranteed by the nation. In the U.S. and other 
western countries, it is an accepted idea that human rights are protected, but in all these countries 
there still exists governmental violations of human rights to this very day. The study of human 
rights is challenging because it is difficult to come up with a tool to measure human rights 
violations. There is no one solution to account for all human rights challenges that exist.  Rather, 
human rights have many dimensions that must be examined and considered in order to grasp the 
complexity that makes the issue of human rights unique. In the examination of human rights, 
scholars tend to focus on government repression and how to respect certain rights, whether they 
are civil and political liberties from Freedom House or physical integrity rights from CIRI 
Human Rights Data Project. This study focuses on physical integrity rights or a government’s 
physical acts and treatments upon its citizen. 
 What are human rights? Jack Donnelly noted that “[human] rights, are, literally, the rights 
that one has simply because one is a human being” (Donnelly 10). Donnelly explained the 
definition of human rights in the following passage: 
Human rights are equal rights: one either is or is not a human being, and therefore has the 
same human rights as everyone else (or none at all). They are also inalienable rights: one 
cannot stop being human, no matter how badly one behaves nor how barbarously one is 
treated. And they are universal rights in the sense that today we consider all members of 
the species Homo sapiens “human beings,” and thus holders of human rights…Human 
rights are not just abstract values such as liberty, equality, and security. They are rights, 
particular social practices to realize those values. A human right thus should not be 
confused with the values or aspirations underlying it or with enjoyment of the object of 
the right (Donnelly 10-11).  
 




our society. The significance of human rights becomes important when the state exercises its 
responsibility to protect the human rights of its citizens.  
 Freedom House is a “watchdog organization that supports the expansion of freedom 
around the world.” This organization believes that political rights are important because they 
“enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for 
distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and 
organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are 
accountable to the electorate.”  In conjunction with political rights, this organization also 
promotes civil liberties, which “allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational 
and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the 
state” (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm).  
 Physical integrity rights primarily focuses on government use of extrajudicial killings, 
disappearances, political imprisonment, and torture. Physical integrity rights data can be obtained 
through the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. CIRI defines individual physical 
integrity rights in the following passage: 
Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or 
physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of 
government officials. Torture includes the use of physical and other force by 
police and prison guards that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading. Political 
imprisonment refers to the incarceration of people by government officials 
because of their ideas, including religious beliefs; their nonviolent religious 
practices, including proselytizing; their speech; their nonviolent opposition to 
government policies or leaders; or their membership in a group, including an 
ethnic or racial group. Individuals who are imprisoned because they have 
committed violent acts, regardless of the reason they committed those acts, are not 
considered political prisoners…Extrajudicial killings are killings by government 
officials without due process of law. They include murders by private groups if 
instigated by government. Disappearances refer to the unresolved cases in which 
political motivation appears likely and in which the victims have not been found 





Empirical research is more concerned with the nation’s treatment and respect for the rights of its 
citizens, particularly human rights practices that are displayed by the government. Human rights 
have many dimensions because there are multiple and different type of rights and each right 
captures unique conditions and situations.  
 The purpose of this research is to identify important political and economic factors that 
affect human rights conditions. This study’s primary focus is to find out whether or not human 
rights have any impact on U.S. trade? Through my research I have discovered that human rights 
is not an important factor to U.S. trade.  
 Empirical research in human rights focuses particularly on trying to explain the link of 
economic and political phenomena to human rights. Part of this research tries to identify 
economic and political factors that are relevant in human rights literature. Statistical analysis is 
used to determine what factors are significant. Statistical analysis is an important part because it 
can help explore our theories on possible relationships between U.S. bilateral trade engagement 
and human rights will be tested with statistical analysis. Another important part of the research is 
to link theories to the statistical analysis and come up with possible explanations of the 
relationship of economy and politics to human rights. Human rights studies is a new and 
constantly evolving field with continuous contributions by scholars to provide better 
understanding and ways to improve research methodology.  
 Congressional mandates in the mid 1970s helped spur interest to protect human rights 
and incorporate such consideration in U.S. foreign policy, particularly focusing on foreign aid 
allocation (Mitchell & McCormick 482-483; Apodaca & Stohl 186). The study of human rights 
has primarily focused on U.S. foreign policy, immigration policies, and empirical research on the 




Keith 291).  Much empirical research has examined the link between globalization and economic 
development to human rights. These studies examine whether economic development could lead 
to better human rights practices and whether globalization might lead to more governmental 
repression. Other studies such as Apodaca (883-905) and Younas (661-674) focus on the effect 
of bilateral and multilateral aid allocations on human rights practices, but there has not been 
much study focusing on human rights and bilateral trade flows. There is a need to examine the 
impact of human rights on bilateral trade, particularly focusing on U.S. trade practices. This 
study hopes to contribute to the continual expanding knowledge of human rights literature. 
 In order to understand the link between human rights and trade, the literature review 
process will examine political and economic factors that are important and relevant in human 
rights literature. I will also include important themes that are discussed throughout human rights 
and trade studies. A key concept that is highlighted in human rights literature would be regime 
type, particularly focusing on democratic governance, the examination of the role of democracy 
in promoting better human rights practices. This study proves that human rights, particularly 
physical integrity rights, is not a major determinant in U.S. trade. 
Literature Review  
 The study of human rights has been primarily concerned with empirical research and 
implementation of U.S. foreign policy that seeks to protect human rights in determining foreign 
aid allocation. Some human rights research is not focused on the philosophical debate but rather 
focuses on the empirical and theoretical approach and analysis. In order to determine if human 
rights has a possible impact on U.S. bilateral trade, it becomes necessary to identify political, 
economic, and strategic factors that affect the relationship between these two concepts. 




and political processes is not a simple task. Trade and human rights are interconnected with other 
issues such as poverty, economic development, globalization, and governmental repression that 
are relevant to understanding the big picture. The literature review is designed to identify the 
economic and political processes that link human rights to trade, but at the same time 
encompassing other possible links that are intractably associated with processes such as 
globalization and democratic governance. Globalization, economic development, trade, and 
poverty are all irrefutably linked. It must be examined if these phenomena support better human 
rights practices, and human rights abuses are unfortunate consequences of often successful 
business models. Businesses have to maintain a positive image and such images involve an 
opportunity cost between two things: doing business with countries that violate human rights or 
the possibility of losing potential profits in order to promote better human conditions.  
 One of the most relevant political factors that is used in both trade and human rights 
literature is a regime type particularly focusing on democratic governance. Democratic 
institutions are more inclined to respect human rights because of "institutional constraints" that 
depend on building mutual relations that promote cooperation over conflict (Polacheck 55-78; 
Pollins 737-761; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 477–513; Apodaca 883-905; Harrelson-
Stephen & Callaway 143-158; Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 593-629; Cox & Drury 709-722; Blanton 
& Blanton 100, 108; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). Regime type matters, particularly democratic 
regimes that play a role in respecting human rights and building cooperation. This is important 
because countries that tend to enter conflicts might increase human rights abuses and produce an 
environment that is detrimental to trade and building better relations (Polacheck 55-78; Pollins 
737-761; Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 143-158; Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 593-629; Cox & 




governance, spurs from the "democratic peace theory," which contends that "spreading 
democracy will make the world peaceful" through the use of economic sanctions as a threat to 
provide incentives to alter behavior (Cox & Drury 712). This argument suggests democracy 
brings peace, and with the help of globalization, brings about political and economic changes 
through the installment of the democratic system and capitalism. Globalization phenomena force 
players to take into consideration human rights because active participants of the international 
system follow international standards. International trade seems to play multiple roles to promote 
human rights practices and indirectly force other participants to comply with democratic 
principles (Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 144). Countries that are active participants in the 
international system must follow norms by forcing regimes to recognize human rights and 
provide incentives to alter behavior, such as influencing trade practices (Cingranelli & Richards 
531; Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 143-158; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 477–513; 
Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). Regime type does play a role, but it is important to examine the 
extent of such an effect on human rights. 
 Mansfield et al. (143-158) suggest that democratic regimes have a better chance of 
completing a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTAs) than autocratic regimes because they share 
similar political institutions. Democratic regimes can be held accountable for their actions by the 
voters, so there is enormous political pressure at the domestic front to negotiate a trade 
agreement because it can affect an incumbent election outcome. For example, President Bill 
Clinton faced tremendous political pressure to pass NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement) because the failure to deliver NAFTA through Congress could have lost voter 
confidence and faith in his ability to govern and manage controversial issues. Internal domestic 




regimes, and in the international front build better relations with other democratic partners 
(Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 477–513). This shows that regime types do matter in trade 
agreements because these regimes share similar values and are least likely in conflict with one 
another shaped by their institutional design.  
 A common theme in the study of human rights and trade is cooperation and conflict. This 
is a very important theme in human rights studies, but this theme is not the focus of this thesis. 
However, I think further examinations into this matter are important and would yield interesting 
and fascinating insights linking human rights violations to conflict areas. Some scholars would 
measure conflict by looking at civil war and international war (which can also be considered 
domestic and interstate conflict), and the idea of conflict does have an effect on trade or human 
rights (Polacheck 55-78; Pollins 737-761; Cingranelli & Richards 512; Mansfield, Milner, and 
Rosendorff 477–513; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). Polacheck suggests trade can bring peace 
through "mutual dependencies," which would make "conflict more costly, thereby increasing the 
incentives toward cooperation, and hence peace" (Polacheck 56). Interstate conflict and 
cooperation play a role in bilateral trade flows because both interstate conflict and cooperation 
have an impact on the amount of commerce flowing into a country (Pollins 757). Stability of 
political ties is important in the sense that it will help limit exposure to risk and "minimize the 
possibility of economic disruption" (Pollins 741). Pollins examines import-export relations in 
dealing with bilateral trade. Importers are less likely to engage in trade practices with countries 
that tend to be in conflict while trade will increase for importers if they engage with countries 
that cooperate (Pollins 741). Bilateral trade can affect respect for human rights by encouraging 
cooperative outcomes that create stability of trade flows and bilateral relations. Therefore, 




Bilateral trade can accommodate and promote human rights especially when exporting 
countries that share compatible interests and political structures with both conditions met. 
Bilateral trade and similar interests can provide incentives that appeal to a state to improve 
human rights practices (Greenhill & Prakash 2). An exporting country with a high level of 
respect for human rights tends to be effective at influencing its export partners to adopt tougher 
standards of human rights to maintain better trade relations (Greenhill & Prakash 2). The spread 
of human rights is more effective when both the individual export country and its recipient have 
tough human rights practices that can illustrate an appealing bilateral trade environment 
(Greenhill & Prakash 2). Human rights standards establish an informal norm on how countries 
should do business and place expectations that respect human rights as a partial criterion for 
building a better bilateral trade relationship for exporting countries (Greenhill & Prakash 4). 
International trade serves a dual purpose for human rights by establishing a reward and 
punishment system to influence states to change their behavior and promote better human rights 
practices (Harrelson -Stephen & Callaway 145-146). Trade can accommodate and promote 
human rights by forcing states to adopt the standard norms of participating in the global 
economy and indirectly install democratic principles through trade (Harrelson -Stephen & 
Callaway 144). Therefore, this shows that international trade tends to lead to better human rights 
practices. 
  Political factors that influence trade would be “interstate cooperation and conflict, regime 
type, common organizational membership” and “international institutions” (Blanton & Blanton 
99). Common organizational membership like Regional Trade Arrangements and NAFTA are 
agreements that can influence trade and human rights. International institutions like the United 




and discussions (Pollins 737-761; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36; Mansfield, Milner, Rosendorff  
477-513).  These organizations play a role in the trade discussions and participants of the 
international community must have consideration for human rights so one can expect reduction 
in the level of repression of a state's citizens. International institutions function and operate 
similarly to a private business which has an image to maintain. They are obligated to manage and 
mediate disputes when an issue such as human rights can stir disagreements among its members 
and participants. If external issues such as human rights permeated trade discussions, individual 
states must adhere to international demands and standards. 
 Other political factors are relevant in the literature, and some of these factors are used as 
explanatory variables in other studies to measure robustness. The most common identifiable 
variable in the human rights and trade literature is population, geographical proximity (also 
known as distance in some studies), common language, and shared colonial heritage (former 
western colony). Population also can be referred to as density (a state population density). 
Scholars who analyze governmental repression on human rights violations hypothesize that with 
a bigger population there might be greater propensity to violate human rights (Hafner-Burton, 
2005a, 617; Poe, Tate, and Keith 294). Other scholars contend that population has negative 
association with trade because "countries with large populations have larger internal markets and 
may thus be less reliant on external trade" (Blanton & Blanton 105). Common language and 
geographical proximity are two variables that are identified in the economic literature (Blanton 
& Blanton 105). Distance relies on the Gravity Model, which is used in bilateral trade flow 
studies and other economic studies that try to link foreign aid allocation to human rights (Pollins 
749-750; Deardorff 4; Mansfield, Milner, Rosendorff 497; Neumayer 510-527; Greenhill & 




because the farther the distance between one country to another, the higher the cost of 
transportation. Distance is more of an economic factor, but at the same time it can incorporate 
political concerns that must be considered in transportation and movement of goods and services 
across national boundaries. Common language "serves as a proxy for cultural similarities and a 
colonial legacy, both conditions encourage trade" (Blanton & Blanton 105). Colonial history or 
heritage suggests that past influence might affect the individual state behaviors and its treatment 
of human rights. In foreign aid allocation studies, a country with a colonial background can 
impact how much it receives because of cultural and past affiliations (Mitchell & McCormick 
480; Mansfield, Milner, Rosendorff 497; Neumayer 524; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36; Younas 661-
674). These variables are commonly used as explanatory variables to measure robustness. 
Population and geographical proximity are important because they are a measure of market size, 
and market size captures economic phenomena that have possible impacts on trade and human 
rights. Common language and colonial history show that past political and social experience can 
be beneficial for a country to obtain more foreign aid funding. Past affiliation establishes 
relations between donors and recipients. Donors have a vital interest in providing more 
assistance to their former colony, which helps to develop better relations between donor and 
recipient. A good example is the United Kingdom's former colonization of Africa. South Africa’s 
development is crucial to the U.K. and if South Africa performs well economically it will benefit 
both sides. The United Kingdom would have a vested concern to South Africa’s economic 
growth by ensuring that this developing nation receives the necessary aid to progress. 
 There are also other political factors that scholars use. Brian Pollins examines political 
factors that look at concepts such as political alignment, political climate, and conflict to see how 




influence and, therefore, trade can play a role in political alignment (740). Political climate is 
important because it helps to create stabilities which establish the necessary environment for 
secure relations between two countries to negotiate and do business (Pollins 741). In order to test 
his political factors, Pollins examines export and import behaviors between countries. Brian 
Greenhill and Aseem Prakash examine political openness and political space by investigating a 
nation’s ability to hold the necessary amount of export capacity (1-36). In order to measure 
political openness they used the Polity IV measurement. The Polity IV project rates a country’s 
political system on a scale of -10 to 10, with -10 being the least democratic to 10 the most 
democratic. One study looks at six industrialized and democratic countries and examines factors 
that support trade liberalization (Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 829-851). Kaltenthaler et al. 
(829-851) explore political factors at the national level such as income distribution, cognitive 
mobilization, and geographic orientation. They found that their economic indicators such as 
education were more significant than political indicators (Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 
845). All of these studies suggest that political systems that exist within a country are important 
factors in trade matters because democratic countries can face voters in the election, therefore 
major incentives exist for leaders in these countries to negotiate successfully for an agreement. 
Trade agreements provide employment opportunities and build long-term relations that can 
benefit incumbents and favor the incumbent in an election year. It can be inferred that 
democratic countries tend to trade with their democratic counterparts more than their autocratic 
regimes. Autocratic regimes do not have to face voters, so there is little accountability for leaders 
in these countries (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 476-498). Therefore, political climate and 
political alignment become necessary components in successful bilateral trade relations. Some 




human rights. They use dummy variables in order to measure the influence of a country’s impact 
on aid or when measuring cultural and religious differences. Neumayer uses socialist countries as 
a foundation to measure if aid allocation is affected if a country were to be socialist.  He uses 
Egypt as a dummy variable for the level strategic significance to the U.S. (Neumayer 510-527). 
Neumayer focuses on socialist countries in order to see if there were any differences in foreign 
aid allocation due to political systems that exist within a country. Younas follows a similar 
procedure to Neumayer, but he includes Israel and Egypt for their strategic significance and 
foreign aid allocation differences between Muslim or Roman Catholic nations (Younas 661-674). 
Israel would obtain more aid than other nations because of their close ties to the United States. 
Younas also wanted to examine if religion plays a role in the determination of aid allocation in 
order to analyze possible motives that donor countries might have. The studies mentioned above 
show that political factors do indeed affect the amount of foreign aid allocation and bilateral 
trade relations. 
 Important variables that are frequently used in human rights literature are focused upon 
human capital such as governmental spending on education, literacy, and the infant mortality 
rates. These factors are considered in order to examine the relationship between human rights 
and aid allocation or the relationship of globalization, which is accompanied by economic 
development and investment (Meyer 368-397; Apodaca 892-893; Tuman and Emmert 22; 
Younas 672). Social indicators, such as governmental spending on education, literacy, and the 
infant mortality rates, are linked to human rights and trade because it is believed that countries 
that respect human rights would likely have high levels of human capital and would improve the 
quality of the workforce in the country (Blanton & Blanton 103). Education spending, literacy 




measure the development and investment of a country. Improvement in human capital could 
have possible implications such as building a better civil society, which could decrease conflict 
and promote a stable environment that is attractive for trade and investment. The need of 
improvement in human capital is particularly true for developing countries. Countries in Africa, 
Afghanistan, and other third world nations need improvement in their education system.  
 Other factors that are relevant to human rights and trade are the involvement of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) within a 
particular country. Oxfam, an NGO, plays a role in promoting equity by improving human rights, 
decreasing poverty, and impacting development through the trade discussion (Aaronson & 
Zimmerman 998). Aaronson & Zimmerman show that not only government plays a role in the 
discussion that shapes trade and human rights, but non-state actors can also play a role into how 
trade policies can be shaped (Aaronson & Zimmerman 998-1030). Government actions and 
response to certain issues such as human rights can be restricted by diplomatic relations with its 
trading partners. NGOs do not have to be concerned with the legal binding contracts and act on 
their own accord, so therefore NGOs can promote important issues without the worries of 
diplomacy. Oxfam shares different priorities compared to WTO (World Trade Ogranization), but 
it forces WTO to recognize important issues at hand. Oxfam continues to be the voice of the poor 
and underrepresented for developing nations (Aaronson & Zimmerman 998-1030). IGOs 
(intergovernmental organizations) such as the United Nations (U.N.) play a role in the human 
rights debate because in order to be part of the international system, countries must adhere to 
international norms, so one would expect IGOs to play a role in promoting better human rights 
practices. Greenhill & Prakash use IGO and INGO (non-governmental organization) in their 




actors do not have to be concerned about political pressures so they can be effective in 
addressing issues such as human rights and poverty. NGOs can helpful in stirring public support 
on important issues and public concerns can force government leaders to take necessary actions 
at the international arena. 
 Greenhill & Prakash use logged GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. Dollars to measure 
economic development and see if there is a connection to improve human rights practices where 
there "exists between poverty and political conflict" (Greenhill & Prakash 15).  Harrelson-
Stephen & Callaway (2003) use economic standing as their variable by using GNP per capita as 
their economic predictor to see if personal integrity abuses are linked to economic standing, and 
they found it to be statistically insignificant (Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 150-151). These 
two different variables measure similar concepts using different methods. Despite these 
differences in method, the selection of variable is based on the preference of the individual 
researcher. For the analysis of bilateral and multilateral aid allocation with respect for human 
rights, Neumayer uses GDP per capita in PPP (Price Purchasing Parity) for his economic 
variable; other possible variables include recipient need and donor interest (Neumayer 510-527). 
Mansfield et al. (477-513) use GDP to measure economic development. They employ GDP for 
country i compared with GDP for country j, then measure the change of GDP for country i and 
the change in GDP for country j. Apodaca uses GDP per capita to measure total output, which is 
the "dollar value of finished goods and services" in attempting to look at economic development 
(Apodaca 891).  In evaluating human rights and U.S. foreign policy, Apodaca & Stohl use 
economic interest and needy people as their economic indicators. Economic interest is the 
amount of U.S. exports to a country and needy people is measured by GNP per capita to assess 




bilateral trade flows) identifies that market size can be measured by using GDP and population 
(Blanton & Blanton 103). Blanton & Blanton use market size as one of their variables to measure 
the effect of this concept on trade and hypothesize that market size indeed plays a role in trade. 
Countries with large markets engage actively in trade and "conduct more cross-border 
transactions" (Blanton & Blanton 105). Population has a negative association with trade because 
countries with sizable populations tend to have large markets that minimize trade impact on their 
economy because they are not dependent on trade (Blanton & Blanton 105).   
 Foreign aid is an economic factor that seeks to address development, and often studies 
examine the effect of bilateral and multilateral aid allocation (Meyer 368-397; Apodaca & Stohl 
185-198; Apodaca 883-905; Neumayer 510-527; Younas 661-674). These indicators seem to be 
used often to measure economic development, which could be represented by GNP per capita. 
For some scholars such as Apodaca (883-905) , GDP per capita is used to measure their 
economic phenomena. Younas looks at bilateral aid allocation (bilateral real aid capita) to 
explore possible motives that donors have in aid allocation: these donors may gain better trade 
advantage by exporting capital goods to countries that use such assistance (Younas 662). Some 
economic variables that he looks at are income per capita, multilateral aid per capita, reserves per 
capita, and domestic PP (per dollar) (Younas 661-674).  
The relationship between foreign aid and human rights is another aspect that some studies 
consider.  Important determinants in aid allocation that are considered are recipient need and 
donor interest. Part of the analysis is to examine bilateral and multilateral aid distribution effects 
(Apodaca 883-905; Neumayer 510-527; Younas 661-674). Apodaca examines the effects of 
globalization on human rights standards in East and Southeast Asia by looking at 11 countries in 




Bilateral aid is good for economic development, insignificant for infant mortality, 
and bad for physical integrity rights, while multilateral aid is good for physical 
integrity rights and bad for both infant mortality rates and national wealth. Trade, 
on the other hand, has a positive consequence for decreasing infant mortality rates 
while increasing national wealth (Apodaca 905). 
 
Multilateral aid plays a role in the improvement in human rights, in particular in physical 
integrity rights, but multilateral aid may not be helpful in advancing human capital 
characteristics by lowering infant mortality rates. Neumayer reaches similar conclusions about 
the role of multilateral aid in improving human rights practices (Neumayer 510). However, 
Apodaca suggests that trade can have an impact on decreasing infant mortality rates; therefore, 
trade can probably improve a nation's human rights practices and promote better conditions 
(Apodaca 905). Meyers suggests that there is a possible link to "development/aid/debt" with 
"civil-political rights" (Meyer 368-397). The economic development process requires that 
developing countries that are more active in the world economy show their commitment to 
development. Such commitment requires large amounts of aid and borrowing enormously, which 
can improve human rights—particularly civil and political rights (Meyer 368-397). Countries 
that demonstrate their development to commitment adhere to international standards. As 
Apodaca notes, trade has an impact on decreasing infant mortality rates, which is a positive sign 
for improvement in human capital  (Apodaca 883-905). 
 Foreign direct investment is another dimension to consider in the link between human 
rights and trade. This concept was used in past studies, particularly in the context of 
globalization and economic development, with respect to human rights practices. Foreign direct 
investment is a double-edged sword because it can provide many benefits as well as drawbacks. 
Benefits from investments consist in providing capital funding for roads, buildings, and other 




because they are often based on calculated business decisions that are focused on profit motives. 
A problem that often arises with an investment is whether or not it is going into projects that will 
allow for a better quality of life to citizens by providing essential life resources. These projects 
may improve water quality, but the money may still not help to create better job opportunities. 
The International Monetary Fund and developed nations provide foreign aid with strategic 
motives give such assistance with certain conditions and stipulations. These stipulations would 
require a developing nation to undertake construction projects (for instance, designing a well 
project that delivers service to local residents for a cheap price), but the these projects can 
become costly: local residents may be charged outrageous prices that make purchasing such 
goods and services difficult. The developing nation would continue to be in debt and the projects 
that were designed to help local residents would, on the contrary, have unexpected, adverse 
consequences. The people in the developing nation would then be forced to pay at a higher price 
in order to use the water from the well that was built.   
Investments are one of the most important aspects to examine in the study of human 
rights, and oftentimes the choice of score used to link human rights and investment matters in the 
analysis (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 687). Hafner-Burton (2005a) describes the problems that must 
be considered in the study of human rights, especially measurements with investment and trade 
indicators: 
The problem is that we are not adequately theorizing our links between the scores, 
indicators, and globalization concepts we think we are measuring, and we are not 
even aware that we are avoiding the issue. We use different indicators to make 
contradictory claims about the same concepts, but the score we use to quantify our 
indicators are often measuring different empirical facts (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 
687). 
 
Clearly, each indicator and score being used must capture what it is we are trying to measure. 




FDI (% GDP, PPP), net FDI (BoP, current U$), FDI net inflows (% GDP), and FDI net inflows 
(% GCF). She found that gross FDI and FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP were "strongly 
robust" (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 685, 693). Greenhill & Prakash use FDI inflows as a percentage 
of GDP in their analysis of human rights and bilateral trade (Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). Hafner-
Burton used the "sum of absolute values of inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment 
recorded in the balance of payments financial account" for her investment indicator (Hafner-
Burton, 2005b, 617).  For the purpose of this study, FDI is taken into consideration because FDI 
is supposed to be used to help address issues like economic development and poverty. By 
addressing these issues, the result would hopefully lead to improvement in human rights 
practices and provide an attractive environment for trade and investment. Meyer suggests that 
multinational corporations (MNCs) can play a role in promoting better human rights. In his 
analysis, he used U.S. FDI, so it would be more appropriate in this study to consider U.S. FDI 
(Meyer 368-397). The use of different indicators by scholars to measure similar concepts could 
be problematic—they might provide different and contradictory results that can lead to spurious 
conclusions.    
 The primary focus of this study is to examine whether or not U.S. bilateral trade has any 
effect on human rights practices. A common indicator concerning this would be trade openness, 
which is measured by using "the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP." This can be 
rewritten as the "sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP" (Apodaca 893-894; 
Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 148; Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 617). Hafner-Burton (2005a) looked 
at five specific trade indicators: Export of Goods and Services (% GDP), Imports of Goods and 
Services (% GDP), Exports as a Capacity to Import, Trade (% Goods GDP), Trade (% GDP) 




[t]rade (% goods GDP) exhibits a significant and negative effect on government 
repression over 80% of the time, as do imports and exports of goods and services. 
This suggests a very strong partial correlation in support of the proponents' 
generalized claims that  more trade, by and large, has a positive influence on 
governments' protection of human rights (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 691). 
 
Clearly, then, Trade (% goods GDP) does matter in the analysis of human rights. Surprisingly, 
however, Hafner-Burton (2005a) found that Trade (% GDP) was robust but statistically "weak" 
(Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 692-693). As Hafner-Burton suggests, which trade indicator is used is 
important and will naturally have an effect on results and analysis. Hafner-Burton shows that 
scholars should be cautious when using different variables to measure similar concepts; each 
variable can affect the results because they all have different statistical relationships(Hafner-
Burton, 2005a, 692-693). 
 Human rights and trade literature are oftentimes at odds and provide contradictory 
conclusions. This problem exists due to the variation of theoretical frameworks scholars use to 
define economic and political indicators, as well as the application of different methodologies 
and statistical models employed to measure the phenomena of trade and human rights (Blanton 
and Blanton 97-117; Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 679-698). There are two main problems identified 
with the literature: measurement issues and model specification errors that do not take into 
account how politics work. Part of the current debate asks whether or not governmental 
repression on human rights has an effect on trade and investment. If there is an effect, then what 
are the factors associated with governmental repression, the use of violence, and torture? John 
Tuman and Craig Emmert conclude in their studies that “more repressive political regimes in 
Latin America received more U.S. FDI” from 1979-1996 (Tuman and Emmert 23). Bohara et al. 
(15) notes that the act of signing international human rights treaties is not enough; in order to 




measurement and models draw contradictory conclusions about political and economic indicators 
relating to human rights is due to the manner in which data is gathered. The State Department 
and Amnesty International (AI) are different institutions that are set up differently and possibly 
contain some biases. The State Department is concerned with sovereignty issues, diplomatic 
relations, and strategic interests, so their Annual Country Report might provide some leeway to 
some countries. Alternatively, AI is concerned with only the worst violators of human rights 
(Poe, Carey, and Vazquez 650-677). "Our research supports the conclusions that the bias that 
appeared in the initial State Department Reports in the 1970s and early 1980s tended to 
disappear over time. Some serious causes for concern remain, though, since the results also 
suggest that just as the biases related to strategic and political interests faded, a new bias relating 
to US trading partners might have emerged" (Poe, Carey, and Vazquez 677). Hafner-Burton 
(2005a, 683) raises an interesting question that must be considered in empirical analysis: she 
looks to see if the economic measurement of trade and foreign direct investment could be linked 
with human rights indicators, which are commonly used by scholars in human rights literature. 
Hafner-Burton suggests that “[i]n short, our theories about which specific causal mechanisms to 
measure…are often imprecisely linked to our economic data” (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 683). In 
empirical analysis, one must take into consideration the robustness of economic, political, 
strategic, and human rights indicators.  
 The purpose of this literature review is to examine common themes that are relevant in 
empirical research and to identifying political, economic, and social factors that impact human 
rights. Human rights research contains many focus areas, and the literature review is designed to 
identify areas that are important and relevant within human rights studies. Human rights studies 




rights violations. This reasoning can be supported by analyzing social indicators and economic 
conditions that exist within a country. The literature review identifies economic growth and the 
condition of a country by using GDP as a measurement. Economic development can be captured 
by using FDI to show the level of development that exists within a country. Along with 
economic growth, we can understand the general social conditions of a country by applying 
social indicators, such as total life expectancy, infant mortality rates, and secondary school 
enrollment. The literature review identifies each variable that captures relationships linking 
human rights to economic, social, and political phenomena. 
Methodology 
 Indicators of human rights that are commonly used in the literature consist of political 
and civil liberties from Freedom House, the Political Terror Scale (PTS) provided by Amnesty 
International-the US State Department, and the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights 
Dataset. Trade indicators primarily focus on economic variables obtained from transnational 
agencies like the World Bank (World Development Indicators), International Monetary Fund, or 
IMF (Direction of Trade Statistics).  My analysis covers data from 1981 to 2007. My empirical 
model contains dependent variables measuring U.S. export to a country, U.S. Import from a 
country, and the total U.S. trade affecting the human rights conditions. The use of control 
variables is important to measure political, economic, and social phenomena. Political factors 
that are important in this thesis and relevant to human rights research is the examination of 
regime type. In order to measure the concept of regime type, I used the polity2 variable in the 
Polity IV project as an indicator for Democracy (polity2 is renamed as Democracy). Economic 
conditions can be analyzed by looking at the market size concept, which includes logged total 




dollars (2000) (represented by the variable GDP). The World Bank defines total population by 
“[counting] all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not 
permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the 
population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates” ("Population, 
total"). According to the World Bank,  
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It 
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant U.S. 
dollars ("GDP per capita").  
 
 
Social conditions can be inspected through the use of total life expectancy at birth (represented 
by the variable Expectancy). The World Bank suggests that “[life] expectancy at birth indicates 
the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of 
its birth were to stay the same throughout its life” ("Life expectancy at birth, total"). Economic 
development and investment can be captured by looking at Net DAC donor flows, United States 
(current US$) (represented by the variable U.S. Aid), the sum of Debt service on external debt, 
total (TDS, current US$)  and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US$), which is 
represented by the variable Debt, and Foreign Direct Investment, Net inflows (% of GDP) 
(represented by the variable FDI). The World Bank describes Debt service on external debt, total 
(TDS, current US$), Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US$), and Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net inflows (% of GDP) definitions in the following passages below taken from the 
website: 
 
Total debt service is the sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in 
foreign currency, goods, or services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term 
debt, and repayments (repurchases and charges) to the IMF. Data are in current 





Public and publicly guaranteed multilateral loans include loans and credits from 
the World Bank, regional development banks, and other multilateral and 
intergovernmental agencies. Excluded are loans from funds administered by an 
international organization on behalf of a single donor government; these are 
classified as loans from governments. Debt service payments are the sum of 
principal repayments and interest payments actually made in the year specified. 
Data are in current U.S. dollars ("Multilateral debt service (TDS, current US$)"). 
 
Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital 
as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net outflows of 
investment from the reporting economy to the rest of the world and is divided by 
GDP ("Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP)"). 
 
 All the control variables listed above, with the exception of the “Democracy” variable, were 
obtained through the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator). I was unable to locate the definition for Net DAC donor flows, 
United States (current US$). The three dependent variables—U.S. Export, U.S. Import, and total 
U.S. trade—were obtained through the International Monetary Fund through IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics. The variable Democracy was acquired through the Polity IV project, which rates 
a country’s political system on a scale of -10 to 10, with -10 being the least democratic to 10 the 
most democratic. Countries that would receive a 10 are the United States, Canada, and other 
western European nations. Countries that are scored a -10 would be Swaziland, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and other Middle Eastern nations. There are other repressive nations that score in the high 
end of the negative range are Cuba, Iraq, and Uzbekistan.  
 In order to obtain my variable, I worked with three datasets: World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (WDI), CIRI Human Rights Dataset, and the International Monetary 
Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). I merged these three datasets by using a single 




identifiers, I used the 3 letter country abbreviation with the unique CIRI code and the individual 
year. For example, Afghanistan's country abbreviation is AFG and Afghanistan's CIRI code is 
101. If it is 1981 my single identifier for Afghanistan would be AFG1011981. In order to merge 
the three datasets successfully, each country's single-identifier was unique. Once the merge was 
successful, I checked to make sure that the merge was correctly done by picking a country 
randomly and making sure that all the variable numbers were correct and matched with the 
original dataset. The Polity IV dataset was also merged, and for this dataset I concatenated the 
unique country assign polity code with the year. I repeated the same process for the Polity merge, 
such as making certain it was successful by checking a country at random and ensuring that the 
variables matched with the original dataset.  
 Once it was successfully merged, I made changes to the WDI-CIRI-DOTS-POLITY 
dataset by taking out any entity that was not considered a state. Rather, these entities are 
territories belonging to a nation. These territories were from WDI dataset. The table below lists 
the island entities deleted from the dataset, and it includes a list of which nation holds authority 
over a specific territory.  
 
Table.1 Deleted Island Entity 
Entity Territory controlled by 
American Samoa Territory of U.S. 
Aruba Territory of the Netherlands 
Bermuda Territory of the UK 
Cayman Islands Territory of UK 
Channel Islands Archipelago by Britain and Normandy 
Faroe Islands Part of Denmark Kingdom 
French Polynesia Territory of France 
Greenland Part of the Kingdom of Denmark 
Guam US Territory 
Hong Kong, China Special administrative region of China 
Isle of Man British Crown Dependency 
Macao, China Special administrative region of China 




Netherland Antilles Part of Kingdom of the Netherlands 
New Caledonia Self governing territory of France 
Northern Mariana Islands Commonwealth in political union with the U.S. 
Puerto Rico Territory of the U.S. with common wealth 
status 
Virgin Islands U.S. Territory 
West Bank and Gaza  
Source: World Bank's World Development Indicators. 
 
These entities hold special territorial recognition and have a certain designation (because they are 
not sovereign nations) that do not allow them recognition by the international community.   
 The human rights variables are obtained through the CIRI Human Rights Dataset, which 
measures physical integrity rights that consist of disappearance, extrajudicial killing, political 
imprisonment, and torture. There is also a variable called (physint) that includes the total score of 
the four physical integrity rights combined (http://www.humanrightsdata.org). In my analysis, I 
did not include civil and political rights from Freedom House or the Political Terror Scale (PTS), 
which are frequently used in other studies. Human rights information is primarily obtained 
through the "Amnesty International's yearly Annual Report and the US State department's annual 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" (Cingranelli & Richards 517-518) . There may be 
differences in procedure and the rating of an individual country between the State Department 
report and AI. However, independent coders from CIRI minimize these differences by working 
out and agreeing upon what the appropriate rating would be. Cingranelli and Richards 
commented that "[i]t has become standard procedure in the systematic study of human rights to 
check these two sources of information against each other...When conflicts occurred, Amnesty 
International's position was coded as 'correct'" (Cingranelli & Richards 517-518). CIRI coded 
physical integrity rights on a three point ordinal scale. If there are more than 50 "confirmed 
violations of a right" in a country, it would be rated as “zero” in the category of "frequent 




score of “one,” which falls into the "some violations" category. A country that receives a score of 
“two” suggests that there are "no confirmed violations of a right," which qualifies under the "no 
violations" category (Cingranelli & Richards 517-519).   
 For my analysis, I excluded two social indicators that are commonly used in the human 
rights literature: infant mortality and school enrollment. School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 
and the infant mortality rate provide a general idea of the social conditions that exist in a country. 
These two variables were excluded due to a lack of information available to make any 
meaningful inferences. The infant mortality rate data was available in five-year intervals and 
sometimes between 2-3 year intervals, which becomes problematic for regression analysis. When 
performing a scatter plot of my dependent variables (U.S. trade variables) and social indicators, 
such as the infant mortality rate and school enrollment, I discovered that the majority of those 
which reported this information on a yearly basis were developed nations. As mentioned 
previously, the infant mortality rate data is available for every five years only, and school 
enrollment is similarly problematic when trying to obtain data. Possible explanations could be 
that developing nations do not have the infrastructure and capital to collect such information and 
report it to the World Bank. Another explanation could be that some countries choose not to 
report it because it could provide a grim assessment of a country's social conditions and could 
possibly hurt a country's development.  
The social indicator on which I have settled is total life expectancy. It yielded a much 
higher number of observations, which hover at 1215 for U.S. exports models and total U.S. trade 
models, and 1212 for U.S. imports models coupled with the total life expectancy. This captured 
the general social condition similar to infant mortality rate and school enrollment. The number of 




much higher value of 1101 for all three dependent trade variables. When including the infant 
mortality rates, secondary school enrollment, and total life expectancy, the number of 
observations hover at 540, which is a very low estimate and not representative of the dataset. 
This may suggest that there is some type of multicollinearity problem that arises. All three social 
indicators were run individually, and the results indicate that total life expectancy yields a higher 
observation. Therefore, infant mortality rates and secondary school enrollment have been 
dropped in the analysis, while total life expectancy remains.   
 There will be three dependent variables (U.S. Export, U.S. Import, total U.S. trade), and 
below is a summary table that contains all the independent variables and dummy variables used 
in this analysis. 
 
Table.2 List of variable name and their description 
Variable name Variable Descriptions 
Yi1 U.S. Export  
Yi2 U.S. Import 
Yi3 total U.S. trade 
Democracy Democracy variable measured by Polity IV 
measurement 
ln(Population) total population in the ith country (logged) 
Expectancy life expectancy of the ith country;  Life 
expectancy at birth, total (years) 
GDP GDP per capita measures poverty and 
economic development in the ith country; GDP 
per capita (constant 2000 US$) 
U.S. Aid Net DAC donor flows, United States (current 
US$) 
Debt the total amount of debt owed by the ith 
country, the sum of Debt service on external 
debt, total (TDS, current US$) and Multilateral 
Debt Service (TDS, current US$)  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment, Net inflows (% of 
GDP) and measured influence of MNCs on a 
country 
Physint the combined score of physical integrity rights 





Disappearance  disappearance in the ith country 
Kill extrajudicial killings in the ith country 
Polpris political imprisonment in the ith country 
Torture torture in the ith country 
China a dummy variable if the country is China 
(China = 1, others = 0) 
Mexico a dummy variable if the country is Mexico 
(Mexico = 1, others = 0) 
Canada a dummy variable if the country is Canada 
(Canada = 1, others = 0) 
 
 
Based on Table 3 on the following page, 12 models are included and each dependent variable 
contains a set of analyses: one model measures individual physical integrity rights 
(disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture), while the other model measures the combined score for 
physical integrity rights represented by the variable Physint. The analysis is divided into two 
parts: the first part consists of Model 1 through Model 6, and these models contain the entire 
model that includes all the countries in the analysis. The second part includes Model 7 to Model 
12, excluding the country of Canada and the dummy variable Canada from the analysis. Each 
model and variable will be listed and described, and the different variations between individual 
models will be presented in a table summary. Model 1 is the U.S. Exports model measuring 
individual physical integrity rights and including all countries.  Model 2 is the U.S. Exports 
model measuring the combined physical integrity score and containing all countries. Model 3 is 
the U.S. Imports model measuring individual physical integrity rights and including all countries.  
In addition to Model 3, Model 4 is U.S. Imports model measuring the combined physical 
integrity score and considering all countries. Model 5 is the total U.S. trade model measuring 
individual physical integrity rights comprising of all countries.  Model 6 is the total U.S. trade 
model measuring the combined physical integrity score and including all countries.  Model 7 




measuring individual physical integrity rights with Canada's exclusion from the analysis. Model 
8 is the U.S. Exports model measuring the combined physical integrity score with Canada's 
exclusion from the analysis. Model 9 is the U.S. Imports model measuring individual physical 
integrity rights with Canada's exclusion from the analysis. Model 10 is the U.S. Imports model 
measuring the combined physical integrity score with Canada's exclusion from the analysis. 
Model 11 is the total U.S. trade model measuring individual physical integrity rights with 
Canada's exclusion from the analysis. Model 12 is the total U.S. trade model measuring the 
combined physical integrity score with Canada's exclusion from the analysis.  Below is the table 
summary of the above information concerning each variable and the different variation within 
each model. Another way to interpret this is that there will be three dependent variables which 
consist of U.S. export, U.S. import, and total U.S. trade within each dependent variable. There is 
a set of analysis: one model measures individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, kill, 
polpris, and torture) and the other model measures the combined score of physical integrity 
rights represented by the variable (physint). Altogether, there are a total of 12 equations: the first 
six models (1 through 6) include the entire set of countries in the analysis, also including the 
dummy variable for Canada. The second six models  (7 through 12) exclude the country of 
Canada in the regression analysis and the dummy variable for Canada. Therefore, another way of 
putting it is that Model 7 through Model 12 exclude Canada from the analysis as a means of 
comparison and measure Canada's effect on other independent variables. It also analyzes 
possible implications that Canada has on U.S. bilateral trade.  
 
Table.3 Table Summary of Each Model 
Part One Analysis: Entire country analysis 
Dependent Variable Model Human Rights 
U.S. Exports Model 1 Individual physical integrity 




polpris, and torture) 
U.S. Exports Model 2 Physint (combine physical 
integrity rights score) 
U.S. Imports Model 3 Individual physical integrity 
rights (disappearance, kill, 
polpris, and torture) 
U.S. Imports Model 4 Physint (combine physical 
integrity rights score) 
Total U.S. Trade Model 5 Individual physical integrity 
rights (disappearance, kill, 
polpris, and torture) 
Total U.S. Trade Model 6 Physint (combine physical 
integrity rights score) 
Part Two Analysis: Canada's exclusion from analysis 
U.S. Exports Model 7 Individual physical integrity 
rights (disappearance, kill, 
polpris, and torture) 
U.S. Exports Model 8  Physint (combine physical 
integrity rights score) 
U.S. Imports Model 9  Individual physical integrity 
rights (disappearance, kill, 
polpris, and torture) 
U.S. Imports Model 10 Physint (combine physical 
integrity rights score) 
Total U.S. Trade Model 11 Individual physical integrity 
rights (disappearance, kill, 
polpris, and torture) 
Total U.S. Trade Model 12 Physint (combine physical 
integrity rights score) 
 
 
 For the physical integrity rights, each set of analyses contains one model that measures 
individual physical integrity rights and the other model examines the combined physical integrity 
rights score. There is a multicollinearity problem that exists if I run the combined score together 
with the individual physical integrity rights. Multicollinearity exists when a change in one 
"explanatory variable" affects how other explanatory variables behave (Studenmund 246, 248).  
If I run the variable physint, which is the combined physical integrity right score, together with 
the individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, torture), STATA 




multicollinearity problem, for each set of analyses I include one model measuring individual 
physical integrity rights. Furthermore, I include another model to see the combined score 
measured by the variable physint. It makes sense to perform two sets of analyses because the 
variable physint is the combined score of the four individual physical integrity rights.  
 When I graphed the three dependent variables along with individual independent 
variables, a common trend was exposed: there is a unifying message that Canada, China, and 
Mexico are major U.S. trading partners and have major influences on U.S. trade. Canada, China, 
and Mexico are considered outliers and can skew the standard deviation toward one side, which 
can affect Beta coefficients in the regression equations. If the regression equations were run 
without considering the three biggest players in U.S. trade, the results would have been biased 
and would not have captured the entire picture. In order to control the effect of Canada, China, 
and Mexico in the regression analysis, dummy variables were created for the three countries.  
Studenmund stated that "a dummy variable takes the values of one or zero depending on whether 
a specified condition holds" (Studenmund 69). In this case, Canada, China, and Mexico are given 
the value of 1, while other countries are given a value of 0. Dummy variables allow us to control 
the time and panel effect for Canada, China, and Mexico. These countries were visible 
throughout each graph plotted. When including the dummy variable for these three countries, the 
R-squared and adjusted R-square increased, and the coefficients and the t-value of the dummy 
variable of Mexico and China became significant. However, there was an issue when running the 
dummy variable of Canada, China, and Mexico in the regression analysis. The dummy variable 
Canada continued to drop out of the analysis, and it turned out that there was no data available 
for Canada for the Debt and U.S. Aid variable. Substitute data had to be procured for these two 




 The United States, Canada, Australia, and mainly developed western European countries 
are part of a panel of countries known as the "22-Development Assistance Committee (DAC)." 
Their task is to provide foreign aid to developing countries with the intent to "[reduce] poverty 
and [promote] economic development" (Younas 661-662). There was no data available for 
Canada for the sum of debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US$), and Multilateral 
Debt Service (TDS, current US$), which affected the regression analysis. In addition, there was 
also no data available for the Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US$) for Canada 
which influences the results. This suggests that the entire country models show identical results 
to the models that excluded Canada from the analysis.  
 There are possible reasons why there is no data for the sum of debt service on external 
debt, total (TDS, current US$), and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US$), and the U.S. 
Aid variable for Canada.  A possible reason is that Canada did not have total debt service on 
external debt and multilateral debt service owed to a multilateral agency like the World Bank. It 
is important to keep in mind that these figures were reported and obtained from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (WDI). Canada is a DAC member, so they do not necessarily 
need to receive U.S. aid to fight poverty or assistance in economic development. In order to 
solve this problem, substitute data was located to replace the missing data for Debt and U.S. Aid. 
Canada’s missing data for Debt variable was replaced by using figures provided from the 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com, and the substitute for Canada's general government net debt 
was obtained from (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/canada/general-government-net-debt-imf-
data.html). The definition of net debt in the passage below is taken from the website: 
Net debt is calculated as gross debt minus financial assets corresponding to debt 
instruments. These financial assets are: monetary gold and SDRs; currency and 
deposits; debt securities; loans; insurance; pension; and standardized guarantee 







The net debt figures were provided in Canadian currency measured in billion units, which was 
adjusted to U.S. dollars. It must be taken into consideration the fluctuation in currency and 
changes in time because the value of currency changes daily. In order to adjust for the fluctuation 
in currency, I have to find the real interest rate provided by the Federal Reserve in order to 
convert Canadian currency to U.S. dollars taking into consideration the changes in time. Real 
interest rate is provided on a quarterly basis by the Federal Reserve. I used the last quarter 
(quarter four) of every year with the exception of Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 because latest figures 
were reported in the third quarter of that year. I multiplied real interest rate with Canada's net 
debt in order to obtain the Debt figures. I inputted these figures into the sum of debt service on 
external debt, total (TDS, current US$) and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US$) for 
Canada. From both of these sources, data was available from 1980 to 2009, so I replaced the 
missing data with information obtained through Federal Reserve’s Industry Specific Exchange 
Rates and www.tradingeconomics.com. The exchange rates uses by the Federal Reserve were 
gained through the U.S. International Trade Commission (http://www.usitc.gov/) and Feenstra’s 
Trade Database (http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzfeens/ ). In formulating a solution for the 
Net DAC donor flows, the United States (current US$) variable, information about whether or 
not Canada has received any type of U.S. economic assistance was researched. The U.S. 
provides aid mainly in terms of defense and military matters, which is found under program 
names such as "Department of Defense Security Assistance" program, "Inactive Programs," and 
"Other Active Grant Programs" (http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/). The sum of the three 
programs was used to obtain figures to replace the missing data in the Net DAC donor flows 




missing data. This decision was made because other countries were reported as zero in the World 
Bank WDI. Data was available for FY 1999 to FY 2008, so I input these values into the dataset 






Table.4 U.S. Exports with Entire Model, 1981-2007 
  Models 
Independent Variables Concepts 1 2 












































































    
Number of observations  1241 1241 
F-Statistics  63.21 78.73 
R-squared  0.8525 0.8523 
    
The dependent variable is the U.S. Exports to a country measures in millions of dollars. Cell 
value is slope coefficient and robust standard error, which are reported in parentheses ( ); all 
estimates rounded to three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when 
*





p < .001. Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 1 measures individual human rights 
(disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture), while Model 2 uses the total score for the physical 






Table.5 U.S. Imports with Entire Model, 1981-2007 
  Models 
Independent Variables Concepts 3 4 












































































    
Number of observations  1238 1238 
F-Statistics  43.27 53.29 
R-squared  0.7426 0.7422 
    
The dependent variable is the U.S. Imports to a country measures in millions of dollars. Cell 
value is slope coefficient and robust standard error, which are reported in parentheses ( ); all 
estimates rounded to three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when *p < .05; **p 
< .01, 
***
p < .001. Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 3 measures individual human rights 
(disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture) while Model 4 uses the total score for the physical 






Table.6 Total U.S. Trade with Entire Model, 1981-2007 
  Models 
Independent Variables Concepts 5 6 












































































    
Number of observations  1241 1241 
F-Statistics  51.48 63.68 
R-squared  0.7994 0.7991 
    
The dependent variable is the total U.S. trade measures in millions of dollars. Cell value is slope 
coefficient and robust standard error, which are in parentheses ( ); all estimates rounded to 
three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when 
*
p < .05; 
**
p < .01, 
***
p < .001. 
Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 5 measures individual human rights (disappearance, 
kill, polpris, and torture) while Model 6 uses the total score for the physical integrity rights 







Table.7 U.S. Exports excluding Canada, 1981-2007 
  Models 
Independent Variables Concepts 7 8 




































































Canada    




    
Number of observations  1215 1215 
F-Statistics  32.81 38.54 
R-squared  0.8000 0.7996 
    
The dependent variable is the U.S. Exports to a country measures in millions of dollars. Cell 
value is slope coefficient and robust standard error, which are reported in parentheses ( ); all 
estimates rounded to three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when 
*





p < .001. Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 7 measures individual human rights 
(disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture), while Model 8 uses the total score for the physical 





Table.8 U.S. Imports excluding Canada, 1981-2007 
  Models 
Independent Variables Concepts 9 10 




































































Canada    




    
Number of observations  1212 1212 
F-Statistics  22.26 26.42 
R-squared  0.6261 0.6259 
    
The dependent variable is the U.S. Imports to a country measures in millions of dollars. Cell 
value is slope coefficient and robust standard error, which are reported in parentheses ( ); all 
estimates rounded to three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when 
*





p < .001. Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 9 measures individual human rights 
(disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture), while Model 10 uses the total score for the physical 





Table.9 Total U.S. Trade excluding Canada, 1981-2007 
  Models 
Independent Variables Concepts 11 12 




































































Canada    




    
Number of observations  1215 1215 
F-Statistics  27.28 31.96 
R-squared  0.7021 0.7018 
    
The dependent variable is the total U.S. trade measures in millions of dollars. Cell value is slope 
coefficient and robust standard errors, which are in parentheses ( ); all estimates rounded to 
three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when 
*
p < .05; 
**
p < .01, 
***
p < .001. 
Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 11 measures individual human rights (disappearance, 
kill, polpris, and torture), while Model 12 uses the total score for the physical integrity rights 






 The analysis was begun with two parts: part one contained models that included Canada 
and all of the countries in the analysis, and part two contained models that excluded Canada from 
the analysis. Within each set of analyses, one model measured the individual physical integrity 
rights and the other model measured the variable called physint, which is the combined physical 
integrity rights score. The results from the tables above provide some startling answers and 
insights into the manner in which U.S. trade was affected by human rights when taking into 
consideration social, economic, and political circumstances. 
 There were four variables that were significant in all 12 models: the sum of debt service 
on external debt, total (TDS, current US$), and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US$) 
represented by the Debt variable, Population, and the dummy variable for China and Mexico. 
The sum of debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US$), and Multilateral Debt 
Service (TDS, current US$) was greatly significant with the t-value hovering at a range from 
4.70 to 7.68. The sum of debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US$), and Multilateral 
Debt Service (TDS, current US$) was statistically significant below the .001 level for all 12 
models. The range of the slope coefficient was between .994 and 1.51 in millions of dollars for 
U.S. Exports, U.S. Imports, and total U.S. trade models that included and excluded Canada from 
the analysis.  The results from each model are as follows: Model 12 suggests that a one-unit 
change in Debt leads to an increase of 1.51 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model 
when excluding Canada from the analysis. Model 9 shows that a one-unit change in Debt leads 
to an increase of .994 in millions of dollars of the total U.S. trade model when excluding Canada 
from the analysis. Models 1 and 2 demonstrate that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an 




and Model 4 imply that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase of .185 in millions of 
dollars in the U.S. Imports model including all countries.  Models 5 and 6 indicate that a one-unit 
change in Debt leads to an increase of .337 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model 
including all countries. Models 7 and 8 reveal that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase 
of .521 to .524 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports when excluding Canada. Models 9 and 
10 signify that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase of .992 to .994 in millions of 
dollars in the U.S. Imports model when excluding Canada. Lastly, models 11 and 12 suggest that 
a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase of 1.51 to 1.52 in millions of dollars in the total 
U.S. trade model when excluding Canada. These numbers suggest that the more debt a country 
has, the more the U.S. is willing to engage in trade. However, these Debt results have a minute 
impact on U.S. trade despite the fact that they are statistically significant at the .001 level.  
 The sum of debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US$), and Multilateral Debt 
Service (TDS, current US$) contains a positive coefficient sign, which suggests that the U.S. is 
willing to trade more with countries that are in debt. Countries that are indebted to the U.S. are 
dependent and rely on U.S. trade to support their society and economy. Wheat and grains are 
agricultural products, an example of a trade product that the U.S. supplies to other countries to 
support their economy and society. In developing areas such as Africa, there is a dependency on 
U.S. agricultural products to relieve problems like hunger and famine caused from an inability to 
produce crops due to infertile land.  
 The logged variable, total population, provides fascinating and interesting results. Models 
that include Canada in the analysis have positive sign coefficients, while models that exclude 
Canada from the analysis contain negative sign coefficients. These coefficient sign changes 




interesting observation was the drop in t-value when the coefficient sign turns from positive, 
when including Canada in the analysis, to negative when it is removed, particularly in the cases 
of the U.S. Imports and the total U.S. trade. However, the U.S. Export model provides contrary 
implications because the positive coefficient sign with Canada’s inclusion has a lower t-value 
compared to the negative coefficient sign without Canada. Models that include Canada appear to 
have much lower coefficient values and robust standard errors than those that exclude Canada, 
which have higher coefficient values and robust standard errors. A possibility for the difference 
could be a lack of control for countries with big populations, such as India, and their enormous 
populations which could be considered as outliers for population. Another explanation for these 
coefficient sign changes, lower coefficient value, and lower standard errors could be the 
possibility that Canada is the driving force for these changes.  
 The statistical significance for the total population varies only slightly for models 1 
through 6, which each contain the entire set of countries. The statistical significance of models 2 
through 6 is at the .01 level, while Model 1 is fairly close at the .05 level. Models 1 and 2 suggest 
that a one-unit change in total population leads to an increase of 257.268 to 282.193 in millions 
of dollars in the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Models 3 and 4 imply that a one-unit 
change in total population leads to an increase of 676.788 to 687.997 in millions of dollars in the 
U.S. Imports model including all countries. Models 5 and 6 indicate that a one-unit change in 
total population leads to an increase of 930.521 to 966.287 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. 
trade model including all countries. 
 Models 7 through 12, which exclude Canada from the analysis, are all statistically 
significant. Model 7 and Model 8 with the U.S. Exports model, and Model 11 and Model 12 with 




model for Model 9 and Model 10 are statistically significant at the .05 level for total population, 
and come fairly close to becoming significant at the .01 level. Models 7 and 8 suggest that a one-
unit change in total population leads to a decrease of -578.433 to -570.561 in millions of dollars 
in the U.S. Exports model by excluding Canada. Models 9 and 10 reveal that a one-unit change 
in total population leads to a decrease of -1134.768 to -1156.021 in millions of dollars in the U.S. 
Imports model by excluding Canada. Models 11 and 12 indicate that a one-unit change in total 
population leads to a decrease of -1708.407 to -1722.211 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. 
trade model by excluding Canada. Scholars who analyze governmental repression on human 
rights violation hypothesize that with a bigger population there might be a greater propensity to 
violate human rights (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 617; Poe, Tate, and Keith 294). Furthermore, other 
scholars contend that population has a negative association with trade because "countries with 
large populations have larger internal markets and may thus be less reliant on external trade 
(Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny, 2004)" (Blanton & Blanton 105).  
 The dummy variable for Mexico and China are statistically significant for all 12 models, 
though Mexico appears to contain a higher t-value and has a greater significance than China. The 
dummy variable Mexico is statistically significant at the .001 level for all 12 models, while the 
dummy variable China is statistically significant at the .01 level for all 12 models. However, the 
dummy variable Canada is not significant for all the 12 models, which is quite surprising because 
Canada is a large U.S. trading partner, so one would expect the Canada dummy variable to be 
significant. A possible explanation could be that Mexico has a geographical advantage and is 
within close proximity of the United States. When it comes to the matter of trade, the U.S. 
benefits with trading partners that are in close proximity because it is easier to transport millions 




must be shipped with large boats carrying large containers. Thus, it is not surprising that Mexico 
benefits more when it comes to distance and transportation of goods. 
 The Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US$), which was represented by U.S. 
Aid variable, is statistically significant for U.S. export and total U.S. trade models including all  
countries models and excluding Canada. It is also statistically significant when Canada is 
excluded from the analysis in Model 9 and Model 10 for the U.S. Imports model. However, it is 
statistically insignificant for the U.S. Imports models that included all the countries, which are 
Model 3 and Model 4. Model 9 and Model 10 are significant because of Canada's exclusion from 
the analysis. It should be noted that only when control for robustness in the Net DAC donor 
flows is the United States (current US$) statistically significant. With controls for robustness, the 
coefficients essentially remain the same as in the regular regression models; the only difference 
is that the standard error is adjusted in the regression analysis.  
 For models with all countries (Model 1 through Model 6), Model 1 and Model 2 of the 
U.S. Exports model and Model 5 and Model 6 of the total U.S. trade are statistically significant 
at the .05 level, while the U.S. Imports model for Model 3 and Model 4 are statistically 
insignificant at the .05 level for the Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US$). Models 
1 and 2 imply that a one-unit change in U.S. Aid leads to an increase of 1.78 to 1.81 in millions 
of dollars in the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Models 5 and 6 indicate that a one-
unit change in U.S. Aid leads to an increase of 3.88 to 4.00 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. 
trade model including all countries.  
 Models 7 through 12, which exclude Canada from the analysis, are all statistically 
significant for the Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US$). Model 7 and Model 8 of 




model for Models 9 through 12 of the total U.S. trade model are statistically significant at the .05 
level for Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US$). Models 9 and 10 come fairly close 
to being significant at the .01 level for the total U.S. trade. Models 7 and 8 suggest that a one-
unit change in U.S. Aid leads to an increase of 1.75 to 1.76 in millions of dollars in the U.S. 
Exports model by excluding Canada. Models 9 and 10 imply that a one-unit change in U.S. Aid 
lead to an increase of 2.86 to 2.89 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model by excluding 
Canada. Models 9 and Model 10 show that a one-unit change in U.S. Aid leads to an increase of 
4.62 to 4.63 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model by excluding Canada. 
 The results indicate that the more U.S. aid a country receives, the more the U.S. is willing 
to trade with a country, particularly when it came to U.S. export and total U.S. trade. Younas 
suggests that developed nations such as the U.S. have extensive amount of capital goods that 
developing countries need in order to assist in the development process (Younas 661-674). It 
should also be noted that aid from the U.S. and other developed nations have a “conditionality” 
that forces developing nations to obtained goods only from a country that is providing goods and 
services. A clear example illustrating conditionality can be seen in the purchase of U.S. products 
from U.S. companies instead of using the funds to create local jobs for that country. If a 
developing nation were able to obtain aid from the U.S., foreign aid contains stipulations that 
only allow that country to buy U.S. products from U.S. companies and businesses. This 
conditionality may be wasteful and can cause inefficiency, as it forces a country to build a 
project that they might not necessarily need. However, in order to obtain the aid a country must 
meet certain conditions, such as only using the funds to build a well to access drinking water for 
local residents. The Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US$) is statistically 




reason for this may be that developing countries in need of aid may have relatively little to offer 
the U.S. It could also be that the U.S. does not need imports from most developing nations. On 
the contrary, these developing nations require U.S. assistance. 
 A possible explanation could be that developing countries such as Mexico, Belize, 
Honduras, and other third world nations that need U.S. aid also rely heavily on U.S. export and 
trade to sustain economic development. Donors like the U.S. have certain objectives for 
providing aid. Younas looks at bilateral aid allocation (bilateral real aid capita) to explore 
possible motives that donors have in aid allocation, such as using foreign aid as a tool to gain 
better trade advantages by exporting capital goods to countries that need aid (Younas 662). 
Countries requiring aid usually need capital goods to grow, and often developed nations have a 
surplus of capital goods and thus can inject capital into these developing nations. There are 
strategic motives involved here because developed nations obtain many benefits for providing 
aid to developing nations. It can be viewed as a good gesture and can provide a positive image to 
developed countries that provide aid. At the same time, developing countries that require aid are 
dependent and rely upon DAC donors like the United States. This dependency provides an 
opportunity for the U.S. to inject capital goods and make a profit. Sometimes this aid is intended 
to be used for a good purpose, but there are unintended consequences with adverse effects, as has 
been discussed. The use of foreign aid can be beneficial and/or detrimental depending on the 
manner in which it is being used.  
 In Models 1 through 6, which include Canada in the analysis, these variable are 
statistically significant: the variable Expectancy is represented by the total life expectancy; GDP, 
which stands for the GDP per capita in constant U.S. dollars (2000); and FDI denoted by the 




excluded from the analysis all three variables become statistically insignificant for Models 7 
through 12. All three variables were found to be statistically significant for the U.S. Export 
model, the U.S. Import model, and the total U.S. trade model (from Models 1 through 6 when 
Canada is included in the analysis). A possible reason why the total life expectancy, the GDP per 
capita, and FDI (% of GDP) are statistically insignificant is because Canada is the driving force 
that compels the result to be insignificant.  
 The GDP per capita is found to be statistically significant at the .01 level for Models 1 
through 6, which includes all countries in the analysis. The result is fairly consistent and the 
relationship between the GDP per capita and U.S. trade is significant. Models 1 and 2 suggest 
that a one-unit change in GDP leads to an increase of 1.739 to 1.755 in millions of dollars in the 
U.S. Exports model including all countries. Models 3 and 4 imply that a one-unit change in GDP 
leads to an increase of 2.873 to 2.934 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model including 
all countries. Models 5 and 6 indicate that a one-unit change in GDP leads to an increase of 
4.607 to 4.685 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model including all countries. 
 The total life expectancy is found to be statistically significant at the .05 level for Models 
1 through 6 including all countries in the analysis. It is interesting to note that the total life 
expectancy is almost statistically significant at the .01 level for Models 3 through 6. Models 1 
and 2 suggest that a one-unit change in total life expectancy leads to a decrease of 102.502 to 
107.954 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Models 3 and 4 
indicate that a one-unit change in total life expectancy leads to a decrease of 152.969 to 169.067 
in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model including all countries. Models 5 and 6 imply 
that a one-unit change in total life expectancy leads to a decrease of 254.621 to 276.293 in 




 The Foreign Direct Investment, Net inflows (% of GDP) is found to be statistically 
significant for Models 3 and 4 of the U.S. Imports model at the .01 level. Models 1 and 2 of the 
U.S. Exports and Models 5 and 6 of the total U.S. trade are statistically significant at the .05 
level. Models 1 through 6 include all countries in the analysis. Models 1 and 2 suggest that a 
one-unit change in FDI net inflows leads to an increase of 105.250 to 105.270 in millions of 
dollars in the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Models 3 and 4 imply that a one-unit 
change in FDI net inflows leads to an increase of 190.661 to 193.733 in millions of dollars in the 
U.S. Imports model including all countries. Models 5 and 6 indicate that a one-unit change in 
FDI net inflows leads to an increase of 294.893 to 298.068 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. 
trade model including all countries. 
 The results indicate a country’s social conditions affect U.S. trade. This suggests that 
there are consistencies in the models. I was somewhat surprised by the result for the total life 
expectancy, because I expected it to have a positive association with trade. I was anticipating that 
social indicators such as the total life expectancy, school enrollment, and the infant mortality 
rates have a positive association with trade. The more a country engages in bilateral trade, the 
more likely these social indicators will increase in promoting better human rights conditions. The 
U.S. is more likely to engage in trade with countries that have a low life expectancy record, as 
revealed by the results. Models 2, 4, and 6 suggest that a country with horrible life expectancy 
track record tends to also have an awful human rights record as well. Countries that have low 
total life expectancy and poor human rights records tend to have an unattractive and unappealing 
trade environment for the United States. Trade relations are dependent upon how stable a country 
is socially. If a country engages in external and internal conflict, it does not benefit the U.S. to 




affected because conflict requires extensive resources which divert precious resources from 
trade. Bilateral trade flows can be disrupted and detrimental to the U.S. interests especially when 
countries have horrible human rights records and low life expectancy.   
 Another inference about the relationship between total life expectancy and U.S. trade is 
that the U.S. engages in trade with countries that have terrible life expectancy, particularly for 
strategic reasons. The U.S. was willing to engage in trade with countries despite what the life 
expectancy record indicated. This suggests that some of the U.S. trading partners have natural 
resources like petroleum, which is considered a vital asset that the U.S. does not necessary have. 
Countries with total low expectancy such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Angola, and other African states have natural resources that the U.S. requires. Therefore, trading 
with these countries benefits the United States despite what the terrible life expectancy record 
might reveal.  
 On the other hand, the GDP per capita and FDI are found to be positively associated with 
U.S. trade and concur with expectations for coefficient signs. Countries that engage in trade 
should be active participants in the global system and, as such, should have higher human rights 
practices. Countries that have a higher level of GDP per capita and an increase in FDI should 
have better human rights practices. Blanton and Blanton use logged GDP and population as a 
measurement for their “market size” concept and propose that “market size will positively 
influence trade, as larger countries conduct more cross-border transactions” (Blanton & Blanton 
105). However, they also note that population would be detrimental to trade, especially countries 
with large population base (Blanton & Blanton 105). This explanation is plausible because 
countries with fairly large population bases tend to trade significantly with the U.S., countries 




could be that the U.S. has an interest in trading with countries that are doing well economically. 
It also provides a favorable trade environment for the U.S. to conduct business. Bilateral trade 
relations are dependent upon a country’s commitment to economic growth and development. 
This demonstrates that a country could be a reliable partner and improving bilateral trade 
relations could benefit both countries in the long term.  I think that GDP per capita could become 
more statistically significant if I use the log function to measure GDP. Blanton & Blanton uses 
logged GDP as a measurement for their market size and their results indicate that logged GDP is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (Blanton & Blanton 105, 109).  
 Similar arguments about GDP can be made for FDI because the results suggest that the 
U.S. is more likely to engage in trade with countries that use FDI. The GDP per capita is 
considered a prerequisite for a country’s economic condition. Countries that are growing require 
investment to help their economy develop. Countries that use FDI provide an attractive business 
environment and demonstrate a potential for economic growth and development. A country that 
is performing well economically shows that it can be a reliable partner and that the U.S. can 
benefit through trade. Investment can be risky and developed nations can expect some type of 
gain in return for their investment from developing nations. Therefore, a country that has the 
potential to grow demonstrates that it deserve the investment. Countries that desire FDI want to 
be active participants in the global system and such participation requires the adoption of 
international norms, such as promoting better human rights practices. Countries that have 
investment interest would prefer a politically and economically stable nation to do business. FDI 
net inflows can be a determinant of U.S. trade just like the GDP per capita and the total life 
expectancy. Maintaining good trade relations requires abundant time commitment so the U.S. 




 Political imprisonment was found to be statistically significant for Model 1 of the U.S. 
Exports model at the .05 level including all countries. Extrajudicial killing is discovered to be 
statistically significant for Model 3 of the U.S. Imports model, and Model 5 of the total U.S. 
trade model at the .05 level including all countries. It should be noted that the individual physical 
integrity rights (disappearance, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killings, and torture) are not 
statistically significant for Model 7 of the U.S. Exports, Model 9 of the U.S. Imports, and Model 
11 of the total U.S. trade, when Canada is excluded from the analysis. Model 1 suggests that a 
one-unit change in political imprisonment leads to a decrease of 505.01 in millions of dollars in 
the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Model 3 implies that a one-unit change in 
extrajudicial killings leads to a decrease of 1688.787 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports 
model including all countries. Model 5 indicates that a one-unit change in extrajudicial killings 
leads to a decrease of 2450.464 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model including all 
countries.  
 The variable Physint, which is represented by the combined score of physical integrity 
rights, is found to be statistically significant at the .05 level for every models that contains the 
variable Physint, with the exception of Model 8 of the U.S. Exports model by excluding Canada 
from the analysis. For models including all countries in the analysis (Model 1 through Model 6), 
Model 2 of the U.S. Exports, Model 4 of the U.S. Imports, and Model 6 of the total U.S. trade is 
found to be statistically significant at the .05 level for the combined physical integrity rights 
score. Models 7 through 12 excluded Canada from the analysis. Model 10 of the U.S. Imports 
and Model 12 of the total U.S. trade are statistically significant at the .05 level, the combined 
physical integrity rights score. Model 2 suggests that a one-unit change in the combined physical 




model including all countries. Model 4 implies that a one-unit change in the combined physical 
integrity score (Physint) leads to a decrease of 850.7276 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports 
model including all countries. Model 6 shows that a one-unit change in the combined physical 
integrity score (Physint) leads to a decrease of 1174.015 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports 
model including all countries. Model 10 indicates that a one-unit change in the combined 
physical integrity score (Physint) leads to a decrease of 478.023 in millions of dollars in the U.S. 
Imports model by excluding Canada. Model 12 hints that a one-unit change in the combined 
physical integrity score (Physint) leads to a decrease of 570.544 in millions of dollars in the U.S. 
Imports model by excluding Canada. 
 The results indicate that the U.S. is willing to engage in trade with countries even though 
these countries have a terrible human rights record. Physical integrity rights like political 
imprisonment are found to be negatively associated with U.S. exports, while extrajudicial 
killings are discovered to be negatively associated with U.S. import and total U.S. trade. Based 
on Model 1, an inference that could be made is that the U.S. will export to countries despite their 
terrible records in political imprisonment. The U.S. is willing to engage in exporting goods to 
countries despite their terrible political imprisonment records. The result of Model 3 suggests 
that the U.S. is willing import from countries despite their record on extrajudicial killings. The 
result of Model 5 provides an interesting implication about overall U.S. trade: the U.S. is willing 
to trade with countries even though there are poor extrajudicial killings records in these countries 
that engage in trade with the United States. 
 As for the combined physical integrity rights score represented by the variable Physint, 5 
out of 6 models are statistically significant with the exception the U.S. Exports model (#8). The 




While Model 8, the variable Physint, becomes statistically insignificant. This means that 
dropping Canada from the analysis may be responsible for making the Physint variable 
statistically insignificant. The interpretation of such results implies that U.S. trade is not 
dependent upon a country’s human rights record. The U.S. is willing to engage in trade with a 
country despite a country’s poor physical integrity rights record. The U.S. is willing to export, 
import, and trade with a country that commits human rights violations. The results are fairly 
consistent throughout most of the models that contain the combined physical integrity rights 
score. Whether it is the analysis of all countries or analyses that excluded Canada, models of the 
U.S. imports and models of the total U.S. trade are found to be statistically significant. This 
suggests that overall U.S. trade and U.S. imports is not dependent upon a country’s physical 
integrity rights record. Similar inferences can be drawn from Model 2 of the U.S. Exports that 
contains all the countries, which implies that the U.S. is willing to export to a country despite a 
country’s poor human rights record. The results provide an important implication: when it comes 
to trade matters, human rights is not an important determinant of U.S. trade.  
 One of the main arguments within human rights and trade literature is that democratic 
nations tend to trade more with their democratic trading partners, compared to autocratic nations 
trading with other autocratic states. This preference in trade arrangements is partly due to 
domestic politics pressures that could help the democratic country to benefit from engaging in 
trade (Mansfield, Milner, & Rosendorff 477–513). For models 7 through 12, which excluded 
Canada from the analysis, models 7 and 8 of the U.S. Exports and Model 12 of the total U.S. 
trade contains the Physint variable which is found to be statistically significant at the .001 level. 
Model 10 of the U.S. Imports contains the Physint variable, which is discovered to be 




trade contains individual physical integrity rights, established to be statistically significant at the 
.05 level for the Democracy variable. Model 9 of the U.S. Imports includes individual physical 
integrity rights coming fairly close to becoming significant at the .05 level.  It should be noted 
that Models 1 through 6 contain all the countries not statistically significant for the Democracy 
variable, which measures regime type produced by Polity IV project. The significance of the 
Democracy variable’s result could be driven by Canada being excluded from the analysis.  
 Models 7 and 8 suggest that a one-unit change in polity leads to an increase of 64.350 to 
80.839 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model by excluding Canada.  Model 10 suggests 
that a one-unit change in polity leads to an increase of 77.381 in millions of dollars in the U.S. 
Imports model by excluding Canada. Models 11 and 12 imply that a one-unit change in polity 
leads to an increase from 140.999 to165.210 measures in millions of dollars in the total U.S. 
trade model by excluding Canada. Caution is necessary when making inferences from these 
results because analyses of all countries are found to be statistically insignificant for Models 1 
through 6. However, the results become statistically significant when Canada is excluded, so 
Canada may be the driving force making this variable statistically significant. The interpretation 
of such results from Models 7 through 12 implies that the U.S. is willing to engage in trade with 
countries that are more democratic. This line of reasoning makes sense: when I performed a two-
way graph with the three dependent variables for U.S. Exports, U.S. Imports, and the total U.S. 
trade compared to the independent variables, I then saw a clear picture, which suggests that 
major U.S. trade partners are western European nations. These countries tend to be traditionally 
democratic nations and the U.S. trades extensively with allies because these nations share similar 
political and “institutional constraints.” Democratic institutions are more inclined to respect 




promote cooperation over conflict (Polacheck 55-78; Pollins 737-761; Mansfield, Milner, and 
Rosendorff 477–513; Apodaca 883-905; Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 143-158; Hafner-
Burton, 2005b, 593-629; Cox & Drury 709-722; Blanton & Blanton 100, 108; Greenhill & 
Prakash 1-36). The regime type, particularly democratic governance, spurs from the "democratic 
peace theory," which contends that "spreading democracy will make the world peaceful" through 
the use of economic sanctions as a threat to provide incentives to alter behavior (Cox & Drury 
712). This argument suggests that democracy brings peace, and with the help of globalization, 
brings about political and economic changes through the installment of the democratic system 
and capitalism. Globalization phenomena force players to take into consideration human rights 
because active participants of the international system follow international norms. International 
trade seems to play multiple roles, which are to promote human rights practices and indirectly 
force other participants to comply with democratic principles (Harrleson-Stephen & Callaway 
144). Countries that are active participants in the international system must follow norms by 
forcing regimes to recognize human rights and provide incentives to alter behavior, such as 
influencing trade practices (Cingranelli & Richards 531; Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 143-
158; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 477–513; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). However, this 
study could not find a correlation in the link that democracy influences U.S. trade. I could not 
find support that democracy plays a role in promoting better human rights practices. Rather, 
democracy has no influence and is not a determinant of U.S. trade.  
Conclusions 
 The results from Tables 4 through 9 provide some answers to the primary question of this 
thesis: Does human rights matter when it comes to U.S. trade? Overall, human rights does not 




not an important determinant when it comes to U.S. trade.  Human rights seems to matter very 
little when it comes U.S. trade because, as shown, the U.S. is willing to trade with a country 
despite its poor human rights record and terrible total life expectancy. When it comes to 
individual physical integrity rights such as disappearance, political imprisonment, extrajudicial 
killings, and torture, the U.S. is willing to export to a country even though a country might have 
an awful political imprisonment record. Overall, the U.S. will trade and import from a country 
regardless of a country’s extrajudicial killing record. This exertion can be explained by the fact 
that Latin American countries with repressive regimes maintained trade relations with the U.S. in 
the 1980s, which is within the scope of analysis. In the 1980s, Latin American countries 
experienced internal political issues—political imprisonment was a tool utilized by the 
government to maintain stability and order by engaging in such behaviors. These findings are 
fairly consistent with the fact that total life expectancy is also found to be negatively associated 
with U.S. trade. This explanation can be confirmed and justified by performing a two-way scatter 
plot graph that shows that the U.S. will trade, export, and import to countries that have appalling 
life expectancy records. Figures 1-3 in Appendix A show that the U.S. trades with countries like 
Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and other African nations that are usually 
anticipated to have a low life expectancy. Nigeria and the DRC are two countries that are 
plagued by civil and internal war, which plays a role in contributing to the low life expectancy. It 
should be taken into consideration that AIDS also plays a role in the decline of the population in 
African countries.  
 A theme that is often discussed in human rights literature is that democracy tends to play 
a role in promoting better human rights practices. The result in this research provides 




by Models 1 through 6, which are found to be statistically insignificant in the Democracy 
variable. However, Models that exclude Canada show that democracy does play a role in U.S. 
trade. But so far, Models that excluded Canada seem to provide fairly consistent results because 
these Models are statistically significant. There is, of course, the exception of the U.S. import 
Model (#9), which almost becomes statistically significant at the .05 level. The inclination is that 
U.S. trade is affected by regime type, so the more democratic a country is, the more the U.S. is 
willing to engage in trade. But it should be noted that any conclusion drawn might be spurious 
and should be taken with great caution before any claims are made. Further examination into this 
matter is needed in order to know with certainty that U.S. trade is affected by democracy.  
 Trade is also dependent upon a country’s commitment to economic growth and 
developmental process. The GDP per capita and FDI are found to be positively associated with 
trade, which implies that, as a country is growing economically, it provides a favorable 
environment for trade and investment. Both the U.S. and its trading partners benefit from such 
exchanges and build trade relations that provide gains to both sides. With any commitment to 
economic growth, a country must accrue debt; and the more debt a country has, the more the 
U.S. is willing to engage in trade. Debt is statistically significant for all 12 Models in the analysis 
and contains significance level of less than .001. The more debt a country has, the more 
dependent and reliant that country becomes. The debt is also accompanied by an increase in U.S. 
aid, so the U.S. provides foreign aid to assist countries in their developmental process. Debt and 
U.S. Aid were positively associated with U.S. trade. Economic factors and conditions dictate 
whether the U.S. is more likely to engage with a country in trade.  
 Younas suggests that developed nations, such as the U.S., have an extensive amount of 




(Younas 661-674). It should also be noted that aid from the U.S. and other developed nations 
have “conditionality” that forces developing nations to obtain only goods from the country that is 
providing goods and services. However, this conditionality could be wasteful and cause 
inefficiency, as it forces a country to build a project that it may not necessarily need. The results 
from this research suggest that U.S. commitment to human rights has been mostly rhetoric. A 
good example that supports such a conclusion is the U.S.-Sino relations. The United States 
makes public comments condemning actions taken by the Chinese government to crack down on 
Buddhist monks who spoke out against government policies. The United States continues to 
trade enormous amount of goods with China despite its awful human rights record. The United 
States’ harsh remarks and criticism on human rights violations are symbolic gestures. These 
gestures show the public that the U.S. government does take human rights violations seriously. 
The bold comments made by the United States are certainly not supported by actions that would 
punish its trading partners for engaging in human rights violations. Sudan is another case of the 
U.S. outwardly condemning a country while still maintaining trade with them. The United States 
and other countries in the United Nations voice concerns about the civil war raging in Sudan. 
The civil war has horrific repercussions for the citizens, such as rape, genocide, and human rights 
violations. However, the tough rhetoric was backed by the passage of many failing U.N. 
resolutions that condemn the situation in Sudan, but no military actions were taken to prevent 
further tragedy. Thus, this shows that the United States relies on diplomacy to address human 
rights matters.  
 The implications of this research show that there are strategic motives when it comes to 
U.S. trade. Human rights violations are a public concern that cannot be ignored and the failure to 




U.S. lawmakers and leaders to condemn human rights violations, particularly for political 
reasons. The U.S. is an important player in international trade, and the U.S. maintains trade 
relations with every country in the world despite a country’s terrible record of human physical 
integrity rights. It takes an extensive amount of time to build trade relations between the U.S. and 
other countries. It appears that the U.S. prefers to condemn other countries’ human rights 
violations in speech alone rather than to actually change trade policy. Making actual changes to 
trade policy could strain bilateral trade relations.  
 This means that the U.S. must rely on other approaches to handling the issues of human 
rights. The best approach to deal with human rights issues is through diplomacy and 
negotiations. It is detrimental to U.S. interests to cease trading with a country based on a 
country’s human right record. The U.S. must be very cautious in the positions that it takes in 
condemning a country because a nation can view the U.S. as intrusive in other nations’ domestic 
politics. This means that it is very unlikely to expect a proactive government response for human 
rights protection; intervening in other countries’ domestic politics through military actions would 
put the U.S. in a tough position. Thus, human rights violations are not a factor that influences 
U.S. trade policy.  
Future Roadmap 
 A common theme in the study of human rights and trade is cooperation and conflict. This 
is a very important theme in human rights studies, but I did not focus on this topic in my thesis. 
However, I think further examinations into this matter are important and would yield interesting 
and fascinating insights linking human rights violations to conflict areas. I believe that it is 
important for future works to include conflict impact on human rights and such a link is crucial 




 Since my research is to look at U.S. bilateral trade relations, another focus that would be 
relevant to this research would be to examine Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Trade contains strategic motives, and RTAs are certainly 
connected to the argument that democracy plays a role in promoting better human rights 
practices (Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 593-629). The argument contends that democratic nations tend 
to enter trade agreements with other democratic countries; therefore, countries that trade with a 
democratic country tend to contain better human rights practices (Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 593-
629). I believe it is important to examine the possibility that RTAs can have an impact on U.S. 
foreign policy to promote better human rights practices. I also want to examine if the U.S. can 
impact other countries through the WTO because the WTO establishes the norms and settles 
disputes over trade matters. I am curious to explore the relationship between the WTO and the 
promotion of human rights. I think examining these two factors would also provide a complete 
picture in empirical research.  
 This research project is relevant to the field of human rights studies. Human rights and 
trade are not only relevant to academia, but they could further provide policy implications that 
affect U.S. interactions with other countries. Trade plays a huge role in the world economy, so 
identifying relevant variables is important to establishing connections on how trade is possibly 
affected by human rights treatment. This project will contribute to a field that is continuously 
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Figure 2 shows U.S. export and total life expectancy for FY 2005 four countries that export with 

















































































































Figure 2 shows U.S. import and total life expectancy for FY 2005 four countries that import with 












































































































Figure 3 shows total U.S. trade and total life expectancy for FY 2005 four countries that trade 
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